The question usually arrives after the event. A heads of agreement has been signed, one party has changed its mind, and the other wants to know whether the document can be enforced. The honest answer is that some can and some cannot, and the difference turns on much more than what the document calls itself.
Australian law has a settled framework for answering the question, and it is older than most people expect. It comes from a dispute over a farm sale in Western Australia, decided by the High Court in 1954.
Masters v Cameron and the three classes
In Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353, the parties signed a memorandum for the sale of a farming property. The document said the agreement was made subject to the preparation of a formal contract of sale acceptable to the vendor's solicitors. The purchasers ran into financial difficulty and wanted out. The vendor said a contract already existed. The High Court said it did not.
Along the way, the Court described three classes of preliminary agreement. In the first, the parties have finalised their bargain and intend to be bound immediately, while proposing to restate the terms later in a fuller or more precise form. In the second, the parties have agreed all the terms and intend no departure from them, but have made performance of some obligation conditional on the execution of a formal document. In the third, the parties do not intend to be bound at all unless and until a formal contract is signed.
Agreements in the first two classes are binding contracts. An agreement in the third class binds no one. The memorandum in Masters v Cameron itself fell into the third class, largely because of the "subject to" language, and the purchasers were free to walk away.
CASE IN POINT
Masters v Cameron: subject to contract
Both sides signed. Money was paid. Was it a sale?
Read the transcript
Western Australia, 1951. A farm sale, signed by both sides, and money paid. Then the buyers wanted out. Was it a sale?
The seller and the buyers signed one document. It was subject to a formal contract her solicitors would accept.
The buyers paid money as a deposit, then pulled out. The agent holding it asked the court who should get it.
The buyers lost at trial in Western Australia and appealed to the High Court. Did signing that document make a binding contract?
The High Court said no. Words like subject to a formal contract usually mean nothing binds until that contract is made.
The lesson. Subject to contract usually means not yet. If you mean to be bound now, make that intention clear in the document.
Get it reviewed before you sign. docetlegal.com.au
Dramatised from the published reasons of the High Court of Australia. General information, not legal advice.
The fourth class
The three classes were later joined by a fourth, drawn from an earlier High Court decision. In Sinclair, Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310 the majority of the High Court had described, as a possible case that did not arise on the facts before it, a further kind of case: one where the parties are content to be bound immediately and exclusively by the terms they have agreed, while expecting to make a further contract in substitution for the first, containing additional terms by consent.
McLelland J recognised that fourth class in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v GR Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622, and the Court of Appeal upheld him in GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631. There the correspondence for the sale of a hospital spoke of a "legally binding agreement in principle". The courts held the parties were bound at once, even though a fuller contract was still to come. McLelland J gave the words "legally binding" their ordinary force and held that "in principle" did not undo them.
The practical significance of the fourth class is considerable. It means a heads of agreement can be a complete, enforceable contract today even though everyone at the table expects a longer document next month. The later document, if it ever arrives, replaces the first. If it never arrives, the first still stands.
What the courts actually look at
The classes are a way of organising the answer, not a test in themselves. The real question in every case is whether the parties intended to be immediately bound, and that intention is assessed objectively, from what the document says and what the parties did, not from what either of them privately believed.
The language of the document carries the most weight. "Subject to contract" and its variants have a long judicial history, and the usual effect of those words is that no contract exists until the formal document is exchanged. That presumption can be displaced, but a party arguing against the natural meaning of "subject to contract" starts a long way behind.
Conduct matters too. If both parties began performing after signing, paying money, handing over keys, commencing work, a court will find it easier to conclude they regarded themselves as bound. Silence and delay tend to cut the other way.
Then there is certainty. Even where the intention to be bound is clear, a document that leaves essential terms unresolved may fail as a contract because there is nothing sufficiently complete to enforce. Price, parties, subject matter and any term the parties themselves treated as essential must be settled or ascertainable. A court can fill small gaps by implication. It cannot write the bargain for the parties.
An agreement to agree is not an agreement
This is where many heads of agreement quietly fail. A clause that leaves the price or other key terms to be agreed later, such as "the parties will agree a price mechanism", is usually an agreement to agree. That is not enforceable, because a court cannot know what the parties would eventually have agreed. A clear promise to negotiate in good faith can sometimes be enforced, but it won't make the parties agree.
The line between a binding contract with formal documents to follow and a mere agreement to agree can be fine. A document that fixes all the commercial terms and simply contemplates lawyers tidying it up sits on the enforceable side. A document that records the shape of a deal while leaving real commercial points open sits on the other. Plenty of heads of agreement sit awkwardly in between, which is exactly why they generate litigation.
Part performance and estoppel
Even where no contract was formed, a party who walks away is not always free of consequences. If one side has acted to its detriment on the assumption that a binding deal existed or would be completed, and the other side created or encouraged that assumption, an estoppel may arise. The High Court's decision in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 grew out of exactly this territory: lease negotiations that were never formally completed, and a landowner who demolished and started building in reliance on the deal proceeding.
Part performance is narrower. Where land is involved and a deal was agreed but never properly put in writing, acts done under it can sometimes allow it to be enforced. It does not create a contract where none was agreed. Neither doctrine is a substitute for a properly formed contract. Both are expensive to run and uncertain in outcome. They are the arguments you reach for when the drafting has already failed.
Words that bind, words that do not
If the parties do not want to be bound until a formal contract is signed, "subject to contract" remains the most reliable formula in the Australian cases. It is not conclusive, though. A court reads the whole document, and what the parties do afterwards can still bring a binding contract into existence. Whether the parties want to be bound now or later, the words on this point decide a great deal, so they should be settled with a lawyer before anyone signs.
The dangerous documents are the ones that leave the point unclear, or that try to do both at once. A heads of agreement that is expressed to be non-binding but contains obligations drafted in mandatory language invites a court to pick it apart clause by clause. As we explained in our overview of heads of agreement, particular provisions such as confidentiality and exclusivity are often intended to bind even within an otherwise non-binding document.
When the other side walks away
If a counterparty abandons a signed heads of agreement, the question is the one the Masters v Cameron classes answer: did these parties, judged by their words and conduct, intend to be bound now?
If they did, and the essential terms are certain, the walking party is in breach, and the remedies are the ordinary contractual ones, damages or, where the subject matter justifies it, specific performance. If they did not, individual clauses may still bind on their own terms, and estoppel or other reliance-based arguments may be open. The answer depends on what the document says and what both sides did, so get advice before you write to them.
None of this is a reason to avoid heads of agreement. They do useful work. It is a reason to decide, before signing, which class you want to be in, and to say so in words a court will not have to guess at.